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ABSTRACT
Since the early 2000s, legal development cooperation has displayed an
increasing willingness to engage with customary justice systems. However,
this engagement is frequently problematic. External actors often lack know-
ledge about the different versions of customary law, the negotiable nature of
customary justice and the power differentials involved in defining customary
law. In customary justice systems, norms are defined and negotiated in ad-
ministrative structures and dispute-settlement institutions. Inclusion in these
fora is therefore of paramount importance to improve the position of vul-
nerable groups. To illustrate the point, this article analyses two case studies
of customary justice reform, respectively focusing on gender dimensions in
northernNamibia and landmanagement inGhana. These case studies demon-
strate that when programming ignores issues of power and empowerment, it
will not have the hoped-for positive impact on vulnerable groups.
INTRODUCTION
Development practitioners involved in ‘rule of law’ building projects re-
cently accepted the importance of customary justice systems (CJSs) for the
majority of rural inhabitants in the global South. Their increasingwillingness
to engage with CJSs in rule of law building programmes is, however, often
problematic. Donor and development agencies’ approaches and expectations
do not easily tally with the complexity of CJSs. External actors often lack
knowledge about the different versions of customary law, the negotiable
nature of customary justice and the power differentials involved in defining
customary law.
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The unwritten, negotiable and relational nature of customary law is an
important determinant for programming, as is the variety in normative be-
liefs and practices within customary communities. Customary norms are
formulated, renegotiated and flexibly applied in administrative structures
and dispute settlement institutions. Inclusion in these fora, where law is
defined and negotiated, is therefore of paramount importance to improve
the position of vulnerable groups. This requires paying attention to issues
of representation and participation of marginalized community members in
CJSs, and their ability to make use of these systems to uphold their rights
and obtain outcomes that are fair and equitable.
To illustrate this point, this article analyses two case studies with very
different approaches to reforming CJSs. In the first case study, Uukwambi
Traditional Authority (TA) in northern Namibia tried to enhance the role of
women in the CJS. Stimulated by the national government and by a clamour
for change from society, the TA initiated changes in three arenas: several
customary norms thatwere detrimental towomenwere altered,women’s par-
ticipation in traditional dispute settlement was encouraged and the number
of female traditional leaders was increased. The measures adopted prompted
positive change in customary practices. For example, the new female tradi-
tional leaders were well accepted by their communities and their administra-
tion assessed positively. In addition, the nature of traditional court meetings
changed enormously, with more women present and actively participating.
The majority of court users were satisfied with the performance of the court,
and felt that men and women were treated equally and had an equal chance
to obtain a fair decision or settlement; a new norm prohibiting relatives
laying claim to the property of a widow on the death of her husband was
widely known, and the practice gradually declined. These new measures led
to significant changes in customary law with a substantially stronger role for
Uukwambi women in the CJS.
In the second case study, a heavily donor-sponsored Land Administration
Programme (LAP) aimed to improve the quality of customary land adminis-
tration in Ghana by introducing customary land secretariats. These were to
enhance smallholders’ tenure security and customary actors’ accountability
regarding land transactions. However, donors and government actors in-
volved in LAP engaged with the customary land tenure system in a way that
enhanced traditional leaders’ powers to administer and regulate communal
land, without attention to the smallholders’ participation and representation
or the need for the chiefs’ accountability. This allowed for elite capture of
increasing land revenues — to the detriment of ordinary land users.
This article builds on six years of research into customary land manage-
ment in Ghana (2002–08), including 15 months of fieldwork in peri-urban
Kumasi. A further two years of research into gender dimensions of custom-
ary law in northern Namibia (2012–14) included five months of fieldwork in
Uukwambi Traditional Authority. Both studies dealt with CJSs and attempts
to engineer change in these systems. Very different means were employed
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in these attempts at reform, with highly divergent outcomes regarding the
people and groups that benefited and that lost out from the changes. The
approach by Uukwambi TA enhanced the ability of a vulnerable group —
women— to participate in and make use of the CJS. The result was stronger
satisfaction with the system and improved protection of women’s rights.
The LAP excluded the vulnerable group that was intended to benefit from
the programme — Ghana’s smallholders — from interpreting, negotiating
and administering customary norms and processes, which resulted in strong
dissatisfaction with the CJS and its leaders, and a loss of smallholders’ rights
to land and tenure security.
These two case studies thus aptly illustrate that programming that ignores
relations of power and empowerment will not have the hoped-for positive
effect on vulnerable groups. Improving CJSs’ functioning and effective-
ness requires a particular kind of legal empowerment — customary legal
empowerment. This term emphasizes the importance of improving repre-
sentation and participation of marginalized community members in CJSs,
and their ability to make use of these systems to uphold their rights and
obtain outcomes that are fair and equitable (Ubink and van Rooij, 2011: 17).
This article discusses debates in the field of legal development cooperation
on effective programming and the merits of top-down versus bottom-up
approaches, focusing on state justice mechanisms versus customary justice
mechanisms. Thereafter, it presents the two illustrative case studies of gender
and land customary law reform in Uukwambi and Ghana, and an analysis
of the resulting (lack of) empowerment of marginalized groups. The article
concludes that awareness of powers of representation and negotiation are of
paramount importance when engaging with CJSs.
RULE OF LAW IN A CONTEXT OF LEGAL PLURALISM
In the early 1990s, law regained an important role in the field of develop-
ment cooperation. International donor organizations expanded programmes
to enhance legislation and legal institutions in developing countries, so as to
promote economic growth, good governance and human rights (Carothers,
2006; van Rooij, 2012; Trubek and Santos, 2006). Traditionally, these pro-
grammes emphasized state legislation and formal institutions, while de-
velopment practitioners largely glossed over CJSs or considered them in-
compatible with the modern nation state, and a constraint on development
(Chirayath et al., 2005). According to Sage and Woolcock (2006), this dis-
regard stems from the belief that law must be uniform and monopolized
by the state, and that development, whether economic or political, depends
on this. The first wave of donor-led legal reform projects in the 1990s thus
focused on strengthening legislation and formal justice institutions, such as
the judiciary, legislators, public prosecutors, police and prisons. Over the
years, legal interventions in this ‘rule of law orthodoxy’ (Upham, 2002:
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75) became increasingly criticized for their ineffectiveness in realizing de-
velopment. Explanations included the top-down character of law reform
projects with minimal consideration of local contexts; donors’ state-centred
approach, with its focus on courts and law-making processes, and tendency
to ignore non-state normative systems and resultant issues of legal pluralism;
insufficient awareness of the inherent political nature of legal reform among
development practitioners; and donors’ bureaucratic structures (van Rooij,
2012).
Responding to these criticisms, at the turn of the century, legal devel-
opment cooperation shifted course towards a focus on the users of justice
systems rather than legal institutions. Employing terms such as ‘access to
justice’ and ‘legal empowerment’, donors now aimed to base programming
on the poor’s needs and preferences. This was to bring direct benefits to
the poor, instead of a trickle-down effect of enhanced justice systems (van
Rooij, 2012: 287). While there are many definitions of these overlapping
terms, essentially they refer to ensuring that legal and judicial outcomes
are just and equitable and that justice systems (also) work for the poor and
disadvantaged. This includes aspects of accessing the system and empow-
ering vulnerable groups to use it to their advantage (Asian Development
Bank, 2001; Golub, 2003; UNDP, 2005). ‘Bottom-up approaches’ generally
emphasize legal awareness, legal aid, alternative dispute resolution and
stronger community organization (van Rooij, 2012: 293).
The increased focus on the poor also led to an increasing willingness to
engage with CJSs, following from the realization that the lives of the poor
majority in developing countries continue to be largely governed by cus-
tomary norms and institutions, especially in the fields of marriage, family
relations and access to natural resources (Harper, 2011b; Ubink and van
Rooij, 2011). However, engaging with CJSs in rule of law programming
is quite controversial. According to Sage and Woolcock (2006: 2–3), it is
‘fraught with its own concerns and unknowns’. Due to high levels of geo-
graphical variation and customary law’s complex unwritten, negotiable and
relational nature, it is difficult to gain adequate knowledge to design legal
reform programmes. Harper (2011a) argues that the amount of research re-
quired to gain in-depth knowledge of CJSs and local power relations makes
for a labour-intensive approach. It is not likely to sit well with expecta-
tions and approaches of many donors and development agencies. Sage and
Woolcock (2006: 4–9) point out that development practitioners tend to see
legal reform as a variant on other familiar technical problems — such as
building roads and immunizing children — thereby overlooking that le-
gal systems are social interventions that ‘draw their salience and strength
from the acquiescence of those using them, becoming meaningful, action-
able, and legitimate through idiosyncratic political and cultural processes’
(ibid.: 6). Moreover, the bureaucratic nature of development agencies, with
their imperatives of measurable outcomes, quality control and working at
scale, leave little leeway for differentiation on the basis of variances in local
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contexts and their inherent complexities. Furthermore, economists are dom-
inant in large development organizations, contributing to a turn away
from local specifics towards more generalizable models. This is problem-
atic for legal reform generally, and particularly for engaging with CJSs,
which is ‘messy, nuanced and context-specific’ in nature (Harper et al.,
2011: 173).
Central to CJSs’ complexity is the fact that multiple versions exist. Many
countries have recorded customary law in textbooks, codifications or case
law, and these recorded versions often differ substantially from living cus-
tomary law (Oomen, 2005; Ubink, 2002–04). Even in living customary law,
there often exist competing versions of norms within groups or communi-
ties, particularly in contexts of large social and economic transformations.
This norm pluralism can be witnessed not only in normative statements, but
also in variation in practices (Chanock, 1989; Ubink, 2008a). It is critical,
therefore, which person or group is given, or is able to appropriate, the power
to define the applicable customary norms. It is important to consider who
is excluded and who is privileged. Limited understanding of the existing
variations may lead to relying on representatives of one particular group —
often male elders and traditional leaders. This may result in that group rep-
resenting customary norms in their own interest, and downplaying versions
that may benefit subaltern community members.
Even in cases where norms are not contested, the unwritten customary
law is flexible, relational and negotiable in character. Customary norms
are seldom used to determine directly who wins and who loses, but are
rather used as a starting point for discussions towards mediated outcomes.
This is connected to the more communal, interdependent character of small
communities, and to the limited enforcement power of most CJSs — which
emphasizes mediation and acceptance of the outcome by both parties and
the wider community. Some see the negotiability and mediation as opening
up access to justice, even for marginalized community members. Others,
however, point out that in practice not everything is negotiable, and that
some are in a better bargaining position than others (Peters, 2002; Ubink,
2008b; Woodhouse, 2003).
Interestingly, the two responses to the failures of the rule of law
orthodoxy — bottom-up approaches focusing on access to justice and legal
empowerment, and increasing willingness to engage with CJSs — have not
led to much awareness of access and power differentials within CJSs. It is
almost as if development practitioners regard working with CJSs as automat-
ically empowering and inherently bottom–up. Legal development actors, and
the state and non-state organizations they work with, often lack knowledge
about the different versions of living customary norms, the negotiable na-
ture of customary justice and the implications this has for engagement with
CJSs. Their programming may alter power relations in the local commu-
nity. Consciously, projects aim to empower marginalized groups, and doing
so may decrease the relative local power base of original elites. However,
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fixating on traditional leaders and elders as community representatives and
custodians of customary law easily leads to accepting elite representations
of customary law. It also forges links between state institutions, and elite
norms and institutions in the customary system. This process overlooks
different, contested versions of law in the locality, and reinforces the subor-
dinate position of marginalized groups. Power differentials may similarly be
strengthened where the negotiable nature of customary law is not taken into
account, and efforts subsequently fail to focus on harnessing weaker parties
in the negotiated settlement processes (Ubink and van Rooij, 2011).
Elite power can also hinder legal reform activities when customary power
holders are able to resist and co-opt reforms. This is especially likely when
the reforms are seen as a threat to the elite power base. The power dimension
also informs the debate over local ownership of development activities. The
quest for local legitimacy and acceptance leads development programming to
work, as much as possible, through local actors. If purely internal processes
are used, however, there is a risk of perpetuating power inequalities. As
the power distribution plays a vital role in improving the functioning of
customary justice, engaging with CJSs calls for a careful consideration of
the local actors and their power differentials, and nuanced interventions to
initiate or accentuate internal cultural discourse. This requires neither dealing
solely with traditional leaders, nor alienating or ignoring them (Johnstone,
2011).
Based on this analysis of the role of power in CJSs and the peril of ignoring
power relations in legal reform projects, it can be concluded that program-
ming in customary justice needs to engage more with issues of power and
empowerment (Harper, 2011b; Ubink, 2011a). Improving CJSs’ function-
ing and effectiveness requires a particular kind of legal empowerment —
‘customary legal empowerment’. This term emphasizes the importance of
improving the representation and participation of marginalized community
members in CJSs and their ability to make use of these systems to uphold
their rights and obtain outcomes that are fair and equitable (Ubink and van
Rooij, 2011: 17). This is corroborated by several studies. In Papua New
Guinea, a project was found to be most successful in improving customary
justice mechanisms for women where it focused on transferring dispute res-
olution skills to women, and women’s inclusion as mediators (Johnstone,
2011). Similarly, in Rwanda, a legal reformproject improvedwomen’s rights
to land, through an increased role for women representatives in mediation
(Lankhorst and Veldman, 2011). A project in Somaliland, which was largely
conceptualized and driven by elders, fell short of its objectives because it did
not include measures to enhance accountability and did not empower users
to demand change (Simojoki, 2011). A comparative action research study
of community land titling in Liberia, Mozambique and Uganda emphasizes
that debating community by-laws and constitutions in an unrestricted pub-
lic forum opens up a space for women to challenge traditional rules that
discriminate against them (Knight, 2011).
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‘GENDER MAINSTREAMING’ CUSTOMARY JUSTICE IN NAMIBIA1
Structures and processes of customary justice are commonly portrayed as
largely patriarchal and favouring the interests of men above those of women.
This gender imbalance is visible in substantive customary norms, traditional
leadership structures, and the operation of customary courts. The patriarchal
principles of traditional justice operate to create a gender bias and ensure that
major decisions on issues such as land allocations, inheritance and divorce
are almost invariably taken by, and in favour of, men (Nyamu-Musembi,
2003; Stewart, 2008; Whitehead and Tsikata, 2003).
Owambo, in the north of Namibia, is no exception. Research carried out
in 1992–93 revealed that Owambo women had limited knowledge of, and
lacked access to, the CJS. Many women perceived customary law and the
customary judicial system as neglecting their concerns. They particularly
complained that they were excluded from active participation in customary
courts (Namibia Development Trust, 1993). In Owambo, as in many other
areas of Namibia, the colonial period witnessed a profound change in gender
relations. While women’s role in pre-colonial Owambo is contested,2 it is
generally accepted that pre-colonial societies afforded women more respect,
protection and security than the colonial society did. For the purposes of
colonial control and to ensure social order and stability, the colonial govern-
ment aimed to strengthen the authority ofmale elders over women and young
people, and thus entrenched women’s disadvantages in traditional society.
Tribal authorities, with the backing of, or even under instigation by, the
colonial government, manipulated African customs to subordinate women
(Becker, 1995; Hayes, 1998). Thus, specific features of customary rule were
‘revived out of their historical and social context’ (Ginwala, 1988: 50) to
strengthen the already existing patriarchal oppression (SWAPO Women’s
Council, 1988).
The colonial rulers’ gender ideology also led to purging women trad-
itional leaders and to excluding women from participation in traditional
courts (Becker, 2001, 2005). Migrant (male) labour and the resulting mon-
etization of the economy further concentrated power in the hands of men, as
it weakened the financial position of women vis-a`-vis men, and downgraded
their domestic and agricultural work to ‘non-paid’ activities. This resulted
in women losing recognition as important producers (Becker, 1995: 97–
98). Christianity and Western missionaries, with their model of the nuclear
family and domesticity for women, deepened women’s subordinate position
in Owambo society (Becker, 2005). Although the Owambo gender ideolo-
gies are a rather recent innovation resulting from many deliberate — and
unintentional — transformations during the colonial era, they are currently
generally seen as ‘traditional’ (Ubink, 2013: 108).
1. See Ubink (2011b, 2013) for a more elaborate discussion of this case study.
2. See Ubink (2013) for a discussion of this literature.
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To enhance the CJS’s inclusiveness, the Uukwambi Traditional Author-
ity — one of the seven TAs in Owambo — under leadership of its chief
Herman Iipumbu, has initiated several changes over the last few decades.
These address gender imbalances in all three interwoven domains of cus-
tomary rule: leadership structures, court processes and substantive norms.
The Uukwambi TA, and its chief in particular, has been actively promoting
women’s leadership since the 1980s, both in speeches and through appoint-
ing women at various levels of traditional leadership, including a woman
deputy chief. While they are still heavily outnumbered by headmen, this
has led to a significant increase in the percentage of women leaders.3 In
1993, at a Customary LawWorkshop convened by the Owambo TAs, it was
unanimously decided that women should be allowed to participate fully in
traditional courts’ actions. In response to this, the Uukwambi TA communi-
cated to all village heads that women were to be encouraged to participate
actively in traditional court meetings and that each village needed to select
a woman representative to act as the deputy to the village head. Another
outcome of the Owambo Customary Law Workshop in 1993 was a recom-
mendation that the councils of the various Owambo traditional communities
change their customary norms to end ‘widow chasing’ or ‘property grab-
bing’. These terms refer to instances where widows and their children are
being chased out of their houses, back to the widows’ matrilineal family, on
the death of their husbands. At the workshop, it was decided that widows
should be allowed to stay on their land, and without payment to the village
head. In response to this recommendation, widows’ protection was included
in the written laws of Uukwambi TA.
The real question obviously centres on the effect of all these well-meant
changes initiated by the Uukwambi TA and its chief. To what extent did
these initiatives go beyond formal changes that de facto improved the rights
and position of women? Did they genuinely empower women as leaders, as
‘judges’ in traditional courts, and as rights seekers? Fieldwork undertaken
by the author in Owambo demonstrates that the performance of the new
women traditional leaders is widely seen as satisfactory and largely equal
to men’s performance. The majority of traditional leaders and villagers
still state that they believe men generally make better leaders than women,
and that they prefer male leaders to female ones. While this displays the
continued existence of gendered attitudes towards leadership, the data show
that villagers, and particularly men, are more open to, and positive about,
women leaders when they live in a village under female leadership. This
is an important finding, as it indicates that men’s opinions about gendered
leadership — whether based on traditional values or preconceived opinions
regarding character traits of men and women — undergo significant change
as a result of exposure to successful female leadership (Ubink, 2013).
3. See Ubink (2013: 110) for some numbers.
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In stark contrast to what women reported in 1992/93, women’s partici-
pation in traditional court meetings has become an accepted feature of Uuk-
wambi cultural life at village, district and TA levels. In court observations,
the author witnessed active participation of women as ‘judges’, parties,
witnesses and members of the general audience. There was no discernible
difference of style in behaviour and speech between men and women. This
may not have been the case for all women, though, as several respondents
stated that some, particularly elderwomen, still found it hard or inappropriate
to speak up during court proceedings.
The vast majority of both female and male respondents reported that they
felt they could actively participate in court proceedings and that men and
women received equal treatment in the courts and had an equal chance to
get a fair decision. There was a marked difference between respondents in
villages with a headwoman and those with a headman. Female respondents
were significantly more positive about the traditional court proceedings in
female-headed villages, in terms of overall performance; ability to partici-
pate in the proceedings; and the equal division of power among the sexes.
Male respondents were slightly more positive about the overall performance
of traditional courts in male-headed villages, but indicated that the power
division among the sexes was more equal and that they spoke up more easily
in courts in female-headed villages. Both male and female respondents were
slightly more positive about equal treatment by courts where the traditional
courts were headed by women. With regard to the changed norms on wid-
ows’ inheritance, qualitative interviews and the survey clearly demonstrated
that the norms have become widely known and enforced in Uukwambi, and
that cases of ‘property grabbing’ have reduced, both in traditional courts and
at Communal Land Boards,4 and occur only seldom nowadays.5
LAND ADMINISTRATION PROJECT GHANA6
Where the Uukwambi case study focuses on gender differences in customary
systems, this land case rather displays elite co-optation of customary law—
traditional leaders profiting to the detriment of smallholders — and as such,
4. The Communal Land Boards (CLBs) are institutions established in 2003 in line with the
Communal Land Reform Act and tasked, inter alia, with dispute resolution on certain land
matters.
5. See Ubink (2011a: 143) for more details. These changes cannot be fully attributed to
customary law only. Although land grabbing and renewed payment by widows to the
headman to retain the land were first outlawed in the written laws of Uukwambi and other
Owambo TAs, provisions with similar effect have been included in the Communal Land
Reform Act 2002 (section 26 and 42). See Ubink (ibid.: 143–44) for a fuller discussion of
this aspect.
6. See, for a more elaborate discussion of this case study, Ubink (2008a: Ch. 2) and Ubink and
Quan (2008).
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highlights class differences in customary justice structures. In Ghana, land
transactions have become increasingly monetized in recent years as a result
of growing scarcity and increased land values. The new developments, and
the changing values in land that they create, result in attempts to redefine land
ownership and tenure, and contestation of rights to land. These processes
have increasingly concentrated control of the economic benefits flowing from
land in the hands of traditional chiefs, which has a direct negative effect on
people’s livelihoods and creates high tensions in many localities. It is against
this background that the government of Ghana, in 2002, embarked on the
Land Administration Project (LAP) Ghana — a long-term programme with
multi-donor support, that aimed to provide greater certainty of land rights
for ordinary users and greater efficiency and fairness in the land market
(Ministry of Lands and Forestry, 2003; World Bank, 2003). One part of the
project focused on enhancing the customary land sector’s functioning.
The Ghanaian Constitution states that customary lands are to be managed
by the appropriate traditional authority on behalf of, and in trust for, their
people.7 It does not make more specific provisions on how customary lands
should bemanaged by traditional authorities. In practice, increasing land val-
ues lead to widespread disputes over power to allocate rights in customary
land and entitlements to the proceeds of these land allocations. Peri-urban
areas of Ghana, for instance, witness severe struggles between farmers and
families on the one hand, and chiefs on the other, over the right to convert
farmland into residential land. Chiefs allocate this land to outsiders through
customary leases (Abudulai, 2002; AldenWily and Hammond, 2001; Berry,
2002; Gough and Yankson, 2000; Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Ubink, 2007).
As a result of these allocations, the original land users, with weaker bargain-
ing power, frequently lose their land, their employment and their income
base. Traditional authorities display little accountability in using monies
generated and most indigenous land users realize little or no benefit from
leasing out land. They are rarely, and then inadequately, compensated for
land loss and in most villages, only a meagre share of the revenue is used
for community improvement. In other areas of Ghana, particularly in areas
with high agricultural potential, comparable struggles over land and its pro-
ceeds can be witnessed between chiefs and community members (Amanor,
2005; Berry, 1997; Boni, 2006; Firmin-Sellers, 1995; Fred-Mensah, 2000;
Hill, 1963; Lentz, 2006; Lund, 2006; Tonah, 2002). As such, the practice of
customary land management in Ghana differs widely from the constitutional
provision that puts the interest of the community first.
In 2003, the government of Ghana embarked upon the LAP, which tar-
geted improvements in the state land sector and the customary land sector.
The focus on enhancing customary land management was in line with the
international trend in land policy in developing countries: to emphasize the
7. Ghanaian Constitution, Articles 267(1) and 36(8).
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importance of recognizing and building on customary tenure systems to
achieve equitable land management and poverty reduction (Deininger and
Binswanger, 1999; DFID, 1999; EU, 2004; World Bank, 2003). This policy
trend is subject to critique because customary land rights are the outcomes
of negotiations, struggles, disputes and implicit agreements embedded in
social relations of family, kinship and community. These social relations are
also inherently unequal, involving power relations between ordinary land
users and customary authorities. The powers and opportunities of customary
authorities to redefine customary ‘law’ in their own interests may increase
as a result of formalizing customary tenure systems and institutions over
which they exert significant influence and control (Anaafo, 2015; Bassett,
1993; Berry, 1993; Shipton and Goheen, 1992).
The LAP sought to enhance the functioning of customary land manage-
ment through developing Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs) as efficacious
land administration structures ‘with appropriate governance structures to as-
sure institutionalised community-level participation and accountability in
the use of stool8 land and the revenue it generates’ (Ubink and Quan, 2008:
205). The CLSs’ objectives are to strengthen the customary authorities’ ac-
countability in land management, in line with constitutional requirements.
CLSs are to provide effective land management and to establish a unified,
decentralized public record of land availability, use and transactions. The
principal beneficiaries are expected to be the majority of people— for whom
the current land administration system is effectively inoperable, due to the
lack of transparency in the land allocation process, uncertain tenure rights,
high costs, and slow, complex bureaucratic procedures (Toulmin et al.,
2004).
Customary authorities in Ghana (and, for that matter, in many other coun-
tries) frequently do not manage lands in the interests of the holders of
customary rights. This is because of the opportunities to generate revenues
from sales and transactions in land. Therefore, LAP’s twin goals—of greater
certainty for ordinary land users, and gains in efficiency and fairness in the
land market — could only be met if the CLS, as an institution, was designed
to promote the land rights of smallholders. However, from the inception of
LAP, it has been the government’s clear political choice that CLSs should
fall under the aegis of traditional authorities, rather than opting for more
community-based approaches to customary land management. By placing
the CLSs under the aegis of the chiefs, LAP ignores that the notion of the
‘customary’ powers and rights of chiefs is loaded with political inventions
and endorses the roles that chiefs were accorded in land administration in
the colonial period— as if this were a timeless principle of customary tenure
(Amanor, 2005: 110–11).
8. The customary community is called ‘stool’ in reference to the carved wooden stool that is
believed to contain the souls of the ancestors. It is a traditional symbol of chieftainship.
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Guaranteeing security of title of small landowners in peri-urban Ghana
against powerful chiefs and elders requires clarifying the nature of usufruc-
tuary rights, and protecting these rights against the chiefs’ conversion drive
(seeMinistry of Lands and Forestry, 2003; Toulmin et al., 2004;WorldBank,
2003). During the LAP conception and design process, however, there was
no wide and open discussion of the chiefs’ role in stool land administration
— including the chiefs’ tendency to behave like private landlords — or of
the possible checks and balances the state could place on this administra-
tion (Alden Wily and Hammond, 2001).9 Quite the contrary, the overriding
need to gain the support of chiefs in establishing CLSs has led to restraint
in pushing for clarifying the rights of land users. At the inception of LAP,
and prior to recruiting dedicated CLS development personnel, the govern-
ment presented the idea of pilot CLSs to traditional leaders, as packages of
equipment and technical support to help resource, and improve efficiency in,
existing customary land management practices. As a result, in the words of
one of theWorld Bank’s specialists, ‘now they like the project because we do
not prescribe anything’.10 According to Aryeetey et al. (2000), chiefs have
been highly successful in getting their issues on the land reform agenda, in
contrast to other groups such as tenants, migrant farmers, women and young
people.
Through the CLS piloting process, LAP staff also had opportunities to
draw up, discuss and introduce Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) be-
tween the ministry and the chiefs, setting out the responsibilities on both
sides. They could thus work towards establishing a wider regulatory frame-
work for CLSs, which would be informed by the piloting process. However,
the government has not made efforts to adapt model MoUs drafted by the
CLS facilitation team, and have them signed as formal agreements between
the ministry and the chiefs to govern the pilot-CLS operations. LAP has
even advised against using, in draft MoUs, language which might be inter-
preted by the chiefs as imposing requirements of accountability, disclosure
of revenues or significant commitments of stool resources to supporting
CLSs. The government has also not introduced a clear policy on the purpose
and responsibilities attached to CLSs, and the parameters for establishing
each pilot CLS remain somewhat ad hoc. What is clear is that, to secure
the votes that the chiefs command, the government was unlikely to risk
antagonizing the chiefs by requiring public disclosure of land revenues and
accountability in their use, in line with the government’s broader ‘policy of
non-interference’ in chieftaincy affairs (Ubink, 2008a: 96–98). According
to DFID’s rural livelihoods adviser, ‘Land reform is not the sort of thing
you’d sensibly pursue, with the [upcoming] elections in your mind’.11 He
9. Also interview, DFID rural livelihoods advisor, Accra, 27 January 2004.
10. Interview, World Bank natural resource management specialist, Accra, 19 January 2004.
11. Interview, DFID rural livelihoods advisor, Accra, 14 September 2005.
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also pointed out that LAP project staff have found it difficult to speak up
when not backed by the minister.
This backdrop of governmental attitude and operation of the LAP Unit
established under the Chief Director of the Ministry of Lands and Forestry,
informs the operation of the CLSs. In their 2007 analysis of the functioning
and impact of the first 10 pilot CLSs established since the end of 2004,12
Ubink and Quan (2008) find that the traditional authorities’ orientation has
been to use the CLSs to consolidate the stool’s centralized control over lease-
hold transactions across much larger areas, and to facilitate the conversion
of land held by indigenous farmers to leaseholds for outsiders. In areas with
migrant farmers, CLSs were also seen as a way to convert secure tenure ar-
rangements of migrants. These were created through long-established oral,
and sometimes written, sharecropping contracts with landholding families,
arguably equivalent to land purchases, for fixed-term leaseholds subject to
rent collection and eventual discretionary renewal by the CLS (see Alden
Wily and Hammond, 2001; Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001).
In contrast with LAP’s goals of enhancing chiefs’ accountability and the
ability of indigenous and tenant farmers to retain their land or to negotiate
higher levels of compensation in cases where the traditional authority re-
develops or disposes of the land, powerful chiefs sawCLSs as an opportunity
to restore and extend their political and economic control over land (see
World Bank, 2003). They sought to use CLSs — and the opportunities
they provided for centralizing land transactions management and recording
and formally documenting land rights — as instruments for land disposals
by the elite, by concentrating on facilitating and documenting new land
transactions, and failing to document the rights of indigenous and migrant
land holders. Ubink and Quan (2008: 210) conclude:
CLSs which strengthen the political and economic weight of the traditional authorities by
providing formal recognition of their powers to administer and allocate land . . . would
sanction their ability to generate substantial profits from the disposal of land, over which
the original land users exert legitimate claims. If government does not clearly spread the
message of the legitimacy of communal interests in land, as recognised by the courts, and
the need for accountability of the chiefs, which is stated in the constitution, then it will be
providing de facto support for chiefs’ claims that they can convert land in which community
members have usufructuary land rights. . . . This will have the perverse effect that people
are disenfranchised rather than empowered.
Studying the CLS’s functioning in Wa, Biitir and Nara (2016) come to
comparable conclusions. In the north of Ghana it is tendamba, first settlers
and heads of their families, who are recognized as the customary land author-
ities. While recognizing certain gains in land administration efficiency and
dispute resolution brought about by the CLS’s introduction, Biitir and Nara
(ibid.) describe how tendamba are not interested in LAP’s goal of promoting
12. In 2009, when the pilot phase ended, 38 CLSs had been established in all 10 regions of
Ghana (Arko-Adjei, 2011).
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good governance, but rather see the CLS as a way to centralize control over
land and reap financial gains in the form of ground rent. The authors point to a
lack of consensus and understanding of the LAP objectives due to inadequate
consultation processes. They also highlight that forming the CLS intensified
struggles over who are legitimate tendamba and between various sections of
the family over the right to allocate land and reap the profits in the form of
ground rent. Families fear elite co-optation by tendamba, through formal-
izing land authority in the CLS. The article furthermore describes serious
shortcomings of the CLS in Wa regarding transparency and accountabil-
ity.13 Anaafo (2015) is similarly critical about the CLS in Nkoranza South
municipality. ‘The reformed system’, he writes, ‘puts excessive regulation
into the hands of chiefs and this is fading into confiscation of ownership, a
practice unintended under customary land tenure relations’ (ibid.: 545). The
negative assessment of LAP was shared by the donors, as evidenced by the
fact that, in August 2009, DFID withdrew its financial support to the CLSs
(see Bugri, 2012).
CUSTOMARY LEGAL EMPOWERMENT FOR SMALLHOLDERS
ANDWOMEN
Researchers and donors concur that the LAP has failed to enhance tenure
security for the country’s smallholders. In contrast, in a country where
both opponents and proponents of gender equality believe that women’s
rights and customary justice are eternal foes (Becker, 2001), Uukwambi
TraditionalAuthority received a remarkablemeasure of success in enhancing
women’s position in customary justice.What lessons canwe draw from these
illustrative cases regarding the engagement with CJSs?
From the broader literature on customary law, we know that when engag-
ing with CJSs, the nature of these systems needs to be taken into account
(Harper, 2011b; Sage and Woolcock, 2006; Ubink and van Rooij, 2011).
Customary law is unwritten and has no clear-cut lawmakers. Customary
laws are formed in practice and negotiated in leadership structures, consist-
ing of chiefs and their councillors, and in dispute-settlement fora. They are
also defined vis-a`-vis external structures, such as the state, with the power to
enforce, formalize, or recognize local rights. In this context, it is highly rele-
vant which persons or groups within the customary communities are given,
or are able to appropriate, the power to define customary law (Oomen, 2005).
Customary justice programming may offer a particularly potent momentum
for defining and redefining substantive norms and the power of people and
institutions over these processes (Ubink and van Rooij, 2011). This article
shows that for groups — whether smallholders or women — to be empow-
ered, they need to be included in those spaces where the law is defined and
13. See also Nara et al. (2014).
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negotiated. Including women in leadership structures and traditional dispute
settlement in Uukwambi means they have become part of the very structures
where customary law is defined and negotiated. In unwritten legal systems,
it is predominantly through being present at traditional dispute settlements
that people get to know the rules and norms, and thus know when their
rights have been violated, or when a norm seems to be applied differently
by the traditional court in similar cases. Through participation, people also
learn the rules of the game: what is regarded as proper behaviour during
a court hearing; how to get their voices heard by the traditional court; and
which things are negotiable — for in CJSs, decisions, particularly regarding
the amount of compensation, are often negotiable (Peters and Ubink, 2015).
The LAP triggered a formalization of customary land rights and as such
provided a critical moment for (re)negotiating the content of customary law.
The failure to include smallholders in the processes of defining the CLSs’
functionality and the customary land rights that were to be protected, led to
the elite capture of local land rights.
Looking deeper into these cases, we see that there are several forces at play
that may have influenced the approach taken in the two case studies. These
include the traditional authorities’ willingness to adapt the CJS; the scope
of economic opportunities for traditional authorities in the sector of pro-
gramming; the traditional authorities’ political power; and their relationship
with the government. In the Uukwambi case, the traditional leaders’ will-
ingness to make customary justice more inclusive should be seen in light
of the TAs’ involvement in the administrative structures of the apartheid
government. It is intricately connected to events at the national political
level.
With independence finally arriving in 1990, TAs in Namibia were strug-
gling to remain relevant in the new, post-independence constellation. Many
traditional leaders felt the need to redeem popular support, and improve
relations with the government. Women’s position under customary law had
come under fire from both government and society. As Becker (2001: 240)
writes about traditional authorities in northern Namibia, the move towards
women’s inclusion in customary decision-making structures and processes
‘may well be part of conscious efforts to improve their standing’.14 In
northern Namibia, traditional leadership, particularly below the level of
the chief, does not offer many lucrative opportunities. This lack of financial
incentive to become a traditional leader, or to execute this function in a
14. See Ubink (2013) for more details. The struggle to remain relevant and gain popularity
may, in the case of the chief of Uukwambi TA, also be informed by the fact that he
is not the rightful occupant of the Uukwambi leadership position. In 1932, the colonial
government deported King Iipumbu, and selected his son to chair the Council of Senior
Headmen. In 1986, he was succeeded again by his son, the current leader Herman Iipumbu,
who is commonly referred to as Chief Iipumbu. Since the Uukwambi practise matrilineal
succession, the latter is not the rightful heir of the royal lineage of Uukwambi.
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particular way, makes it easier to reach agreement on different rules of the
game.
The initiative for the LAP came from government and donors. While
the official goals included protection of smallholders’ land rights, the gov-
ernment of Ghana was not willing to endanger its relationship with the
chiefs, and as such did not pressure the chiefs to increase transparency and
accountability. As a result, traditional leaders saw the CLSs largely as an
opportunity to centralize control over land and maximize revenue (Anaafo,
2015; Biitir and Nara, 2016; Ubink and Quan, 2008). Ghanaian chiefs stand
to make handsome sums of money from their administrative powers over
customary land.15 Despite the official aim of enhancing tenure security for
smallholders, the government of Ghana was not willing to antagonize the
chiefs by thwarting their profit from the administrative position regarding
customary land. Government involvement was limited to formalizing and
shoring up the powers of traditional leaders, without paying attention to the
power dynamics in any of these three domains. Merely subsidizing TAs with
material and technical support for CLSs, providing them with a semblance
of state-backed legitimacy in their administrative roles, and hoping for the
best, did not provide the basis of a sustainable approach. In fact, it made it
harder for smallholders to claim the sanctity of their usufructuary rights in
the land; to ask their leaders to account; and to depose leaders that refuse to
do so.
Thus, the approach taken to change the customary system of Uukwambi
enhanced women’s ability to make use of the system to uphold their rights
and obtain outcomes that are fair and equitable. In LAP, on the other hand,
smallholders’ ability to do the same was diminished through the program-
ming’s approach. The political playing field was conducive to successfully
including women in Uukwambi’s CJS — the chief was willing to make
accommodations to gain popularity and to remain relevant in the newly in-
dependent country, and the government feared no detriment from weighing
in. In the LAP, smallholders were not empowered because the chiefs—who
are strong political actors in Ghana— felt secure enough not to compromise
their powers in the very lucrative land sector. Additionally, the government
was not willing to antagonize the chiefs by pushing for transparency, ac-
countability, and increased recognition of smallholders’ rights (Ubink and
Quan, 2008).
Political context may thus explain the approach taken, or the scope of
development actors to induce a government or traditional authorities to take
an empowerment approach in a particular programme. This does not mean
that an empowerment approach is not possible in Ghana in other fields, nor
15. In 2003, a piece of residential land in the surroundings of Kumasi, the second biggest town
in Ghana, was worth an equivalent of US$ 1,500. In comparison, in 2009, the going price for
a much larger piece of land for a homestead plus adjacent agricultural fields in Uukwambi
was widely set at 800 Namibian dollars, which was then approximately US$ 80.
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that this approach will be possible in any field in Namibia. An empower-
ment approach’s feasibility depends on the field of engagement, the interests
involved, and the case-specific power constellations.16 This article argues
that to engage with CJSs, to the benefit of vulnerable groups, requires a
focus on power and issues of participation and representation. When such
an approach is not possible due to the political context, there is a serious
risk that reforms will not reach the intended beneficiaries from vulnera-
ble groups. An enabling political context forms a necessary precondition
for successful programming. While this is obviously hard to programme
for, it could and should be carefully considered before deciding whether it
is sensible to engage with customary justice programming in a particular
location.
CONCLUSION
This article has shown an increasing engagement in development cooperation
with CJSs. The approaches and expectations of donors and development
agencies challenge their ability to respond adequately to the complexity and
context-specificity of CJSs. They often unintentionally impact negatively on
power differentials within the localities, as in the case of the LAP in Ghana.
This article posits that customary justice programming needs to engage more
with issues of power and empowerment. Ubink and van Rooij (2011) use
the term customary legal empowerment to emphasize the participation and
representation ofmarginalized communitymembers in CJSs and their ability
to make use of these systems to uphold their rights and obtain outcomes that
are fair and equitable. An emphasis on issues of access, participation and
empowerment is perhaps even more important when engaging with CJSs
than when dealing with the state legal sector. This is due to the unwritten,
negotiable character of customary law. Policy makers too often assume a
unified community polity governed by an apolitical community leadership.
Powers of definition and administration at the local level are overlooked by
a belief in a ‘myth of traditionalism’ (Clarke, 2011: 50). The acceptance
or portrayal of the powers of representation and negotiation can profoundly
affect power relations in customary communities. This article thus pleads
for an orientation on customary legal empowerment.
16. One example where customary justice reformmay be successful in Ghana pertains to female
traditional leadership. Queen mothers, who function alongside male chiefs and are respon-
sible for women’s and children’s issues, are increasingly recognized and better organized.
See: www.telegraph.co.uk/women/life/meet-the-queen-mothers-10000-amazing-women-
taking-back-power-in/. Interests at stake here are very different from those in the land
sector.
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